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Doors: Restoring a Presumption of
First Amendment Access as a Means of
Reviving Public Faith in the Judiciary
[Tihe only protection against unwise decisions, and even
judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their actions
and fearless comment upon it. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The courthouse door was once open. Crossing the threshold
allowed the public and the media to carefully scrutinize court
proceedings and documents. Although the door was always left
ajar, it certainly could be locked when a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were in jeopardy or when closure was
necessary to preserve "higher values." In the wake of over twenty
years of court decisions interpreting Press-Enterprises Co. v.
Superior Court, the seminal Supreme Court decision which
afforded a presumption that court proceedings and documents
shall be open for public review, this presumption has been swept
under the doormat. The courthouse door in many cases has
slammed shut. The media waits outside, begging for a key.
Fourteen simple words, carefully chosen 2 and laid out in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, do no justice
to the immense powers couched within its grant. The First
1. A.T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 398 (1956).
2. See LucAs A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION
44-47 (1991).
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Amendment provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."3 Beyond
the Constitution's explicit guarantee that Congress is without
power to intervene and restrict publication,4 it is no secret that
courts have continually interpreted the First Amendment as
promoting the media's watchdog role and encouraging both
comment on and criticism of governmental affairs. 5 Access to the
judicial system is essential to enabling the press to maintain its
watchdog role, allowing it to cast a careful eye on the third branch
of government to ensure that the system's integrity is upheld. 6
Although the First Amendment's explicit language does not afford
the public or the media a right of access to the judicial system,7
the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that "[t]he
First Amendment is ... broad enough to encompass those rights
that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of
the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of
other First Amendment rights."8 Access to the judicial system,
instrumental in enabling the media to enjoy its First Amendment
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION 207-09 (1988).
5. WARREN FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURTROOM 11 (1988). The Supreme Court has also held that the First
Amendment rights of free speech and free press are among the fundamental
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
6. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980)
(plurality) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Plublic access to trials acts as an
important check, akin in purpose to the other checks and balances that infuse
our system of government.").
7. Sigman L. Spichal, The Right to Know, in ACCESS DENIED: FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3, 11-12 (Charles N. Davis &
Sigman L. Splichal eds., 2000) ("A right of the public to know about the
workings of government, as such, is not stated in the U.S. Constitution. But
the framers of the Constitution did include provisions for making government
accountable to the people .... While these requirements for government
accountability seem limited by modern access standards, they nonetheless
reflected the fundamental principle that government should not function in
secret or withhold information without good cause.").
8. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)
(citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 579-80). See Dan Paul &
Richard J. Ovelmen, Access, 2 COMM. L. 7 (Practising Law Inst. 1999). See
also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY 1888-1986 523 (1990) ("The right to speak is of little value if one has
nothing to say.").
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right to comment on and criticize government affairs, falls within
the First Amendment's reach; therefore, as the United States
Supreme Court has concluded, the First Amendment vests the
media and the public with a qualified access right to the judicial
system. 9
Apart from a general common law right of access to criminal
proceedings that has long been recognized in the United States, 10
since its 1980 landmark decision Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia," the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials.12 This
First Amendment access right is unique. Unlike the common law
right of access, which grants the trial judge broad discretion in
deciding whether access is warranted, the First Amendment
access right grants a presumption that the proceeding or
document will be open to public scrutiny. 13 The proceeding or
document may be closed or sealed when countervailing interests
are at stake, but in First Amendment access cases the party
seeking closure carries the burden of demonstrating that closure
is necessary.14 Conversely, in common law access cases, the party
seeking access carries the burden of demonstrating a need for the
information. 15
In recognizing a First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials, the Richmond Newspapers plurality reasoned that the First
Amendment's explicit guarantee of free speech and a free press
would lose its meaning if the press was banished from the
courtroom. The plurality stated that "[firee speech carries with it
some freedom to listen .... What this means in the context of
9. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality); Press-Enter.
Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 11), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); but see POWE,
supra note 2, at 198 ("The press's right of access to people and places has
proven more difficult to establish than the right to publish .... ).
10. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)
(recognizing that the public has a common law right "to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and documents," but
that right is not absolute).
11. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality).
12. See id. at 580.
13. Lynn B. Oberlander, Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to
Affidavits in Support of Search Warrants, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 2216, 2242-44
(1990).
14. Id. at 2243.
15. Id.
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trials is that the First Amendment ... prohibit[s] government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been
open to the public at the time the Amendment was adopted." 16
Despite this pointed language, courts have been quick to note that
when a First Amendment access right is recognized, it is certainly
not absolute. 17 Rather, courts define this as a qualified or limited
right that may be trumped by a defendant's competing Sixth
Amendment18 rights or when closure is "essential to preserve
higher values" so long as the closure is narrowly tailored to meet
that interest.19
Extending this qualified right of access to include proceedings
other than criminal trials, in 1986 the Supreme Court delineated
a two-part test to determine which proceedings are afforded a
qualified right of access. 20 The test, derived from Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, involves
"two complementary considerations." 21 The first prong, commonly
referred to as the history (or experience) prong, considers whether
the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public because a "'tradition of accessibility implies the
favorable judgment of experience.'" 22 Meanwhile, the second
prong, known as the logic (or positive functional role) prong,
evaluates "whether public access plays a significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question."23
Following the Court's announcement that there is a qualified
First Amendment access right to some judicial proceedings, lower
federal and state courts have taken varying approaches when
defining and applying this right.24 The most frequently applied
16. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 576 (plurality).
17. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 1), 464 U.S. 501,
510 (1984).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. See Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 502; infra Part II. See also MATTHEW
D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA, RECONCILING FAIR TRIALS AND A FREE
PRESS 1, 94-115 (1997).
20. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. H), 478 U.S. 1, 9
(1986).
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 574,
605 (1982) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
589 (1980) (plurality) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
23. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 475 U.S. at 606).
24. See infra Part III. See also Joseph D. Steinfield & Jeffrey J. Pyle,
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approach is to define the two-prong test as a "conjunctive test,"
whereby a right of access is only recognized when both prongs are
satisfied.25 Indeed, once a qualified right of access is recognized,
the proceeding or document at issue will remain open so long as a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights26 are not jeopardized or other
"higher values" do not warrant closure. Through this stringent
approach, courts have eviscerated the Framers' original intention
of affording a presumption of access as a means of promoting
public discourse and media oversight of governmental affairs and
have instead adopted a test that, by design, continually denies
access to modern judicial devices. 27 The First Amendment, aimed
at fostering careful scrutiny of the three branches to ensure the
utmost integrity in the functioning of governmental processes, 28 is
significantly curtailed when courts apply the conjunctive test.
Ultimately these decisions reflect lower courts' recent moves away
from a presumption of openness. Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court has not yet taken up the task of allaying the
courts' confusion.
The overarching need for public oversight is at its apex when
courts utilize modern judicial proceedings or documents in their
adjudicative or administrative roles. The public is more likely to
trust judicial proceedings and documents that have a long-
standing history of carrying out the duties of the third branch of
government, while distrusting those without proven success.
Despite the public's need and desire to monitor proceedings and
documents in their infancy, the conjunctive test automatically
denies access to these proceedings because it is rarely the case
that a new proceeding or document will pass the courts' history
prong. The public's confidence in the judiciary, concededly low,
may be partially caused by a lack of access. Undoubtedly the
Recent Developments in the Law of Access - 2003, 1 CoMM. L. 16 (Practising
Law Inst. 2003) ("Application of these principles isn't as easy as it looks.").
25. See infra Part III.A. The test, mandating that both prongs be
satisfied before a qualified right of access vests, will be referred to hereinafter
as the conjunctive test.
26. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. KENT R. MIDDLETON, WILLIAM E. LEE & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAw
OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 28-30 (6th ed. 2004).
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public grapples with trusting what is shielded from its view. 29
Reinterpreting the Supreme Court's test as disjunctive, which
reflects the Framers' objectives by affording a presumption of
openness to judicial proceedings and documents, both new and old,
is necessary to restore public faith in the judicial system. 30
Although less frequently applied, some courts have taken this
approach and interpreted the Supreme Court's test as disjunctive,
finding a presumption of access when either prong is satisfied.31
This approach allows courts to afford access to modern
proceedings and documents under the logic prong alone, thereby
carrying out the Framers' intention of affording the media access
to the governmental processes necessary to carry out its
responsibilities to the public under the First Amendment.32 The
disjunctive test also preserves the history prong, helping the
judiciary easily determine which proceedings fall within the scope
of First Amendment protection and creating uniformity in court
decisions. 33
This Comment illustrates the shortcomings of the courts'
history and logic prongs and adopts the disjunctive test as a
workable means of determining when access should be presumed.
Part II examines the original test announced in Richmond
Newspapers, and applied in Press-Enterprise 11, for determining
when there is a qualified right of access to the judicial proceeding
in question. Part III analyzes courts' varying interpretations of
the test and urges that the leading interpretation defies the
Framers' intentions by curbing what is otherwise a presumption of
openness to court proceedings and documents. Part IV argues that
the Supreme Court's test should be applied as disjunctive,
whereby satisfaction of either the history or logic prong will vest
the media and the public with a qualified First Amendment access
right. Finally, Part V illustrates the impact of closure on the
public's trust in the judiciary and perceptions of the third branch
of government's fairness and integrity.
29. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980)
(plurality). "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited
from observing." Id.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.B, Part IV.A.1.
32. See infra Part IV.A.2.
33. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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II. THE TEST GENERALLY
For over twenty years courts have recognized the First
Amendment as a vehicle for promoting access to court proceedings
and documents.34 In its 1980 landmark decision, Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,35 a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court stood convinced that the Constitution's Framers
intended to afford a qualified First Amendment access right to
criminal trials.36 The decision marked the first time that the
Supreme Court recognized that the Framers, in adopting the First
Amendment, intended to afford a presumption of openness to
court proceedings, because without such a right the Framers'
goals of an unabridged press could never be fully implemented.
A. Framers' intent
A glimpse at history is instructive in understanding the
Framers' goals. In the years preceding adoption of the First
Amendment, debate was strong primarily in Virginia but also in
neighboring colonies, over the need for a Bill of Rights. 37 From
1787-1791 Federalists and Antifederalists divided over whether a
Bill of Rights was even necessary. Federalists believed it was
superfluous to instruct Congress not do that which it had no
power to do anyway. 38 Antifederalists, concerned with federal
government overreaching and broad interpretation of the
necessary and proper clause, led the fight for the Bill of Rights,
specifically, the First Amendment.39 Colonial Americans insisted
that "sovereignty derived from the people's continuous assent,"
and continuous assent meant continuous scrutiny.40  "The
sovereign people needed information and the ability to discuss
freely how their government was performing."41 Against this
backdrop the Antifederalists' persistence and persuasion paved
34. See CURRIE, supra note 8, at 525.
35. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
(plurality).
36. Id. at 567-69.
37. See generally POWE, supra note 2, at 22-50.
38. Id. at 47.
39. Id. at 44.
40. Id. at 27.
41. Id.
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the way to the First Amendment. 42 As one commentator suggests,
"[e]veryone, from Federalist to Antifederalist, had come to see that
a free press was of great value to representative self-
government .... The framers 'could only have meant to protect
the press with which they were familiar and as it operated at the
time. They constitutionally guaranteed the practice of freedom of
the press."'43 The Supreme Court has more recently recognized
that this practice includes not only the right to publish but also a
qualified right to access the information essential to publication.44
Allowing access to the judiciary and increasing publicity afforded
to the third branch of government also carries out the Framers'
intention of creating a system of checks and balances. Beyond the
three branches of government, which serve as the government's
internal checks and balances system, the media, in its role as the
Fourth Estate,4 5 provides an additional external check and
balance on governmental processes. Jeremy Bentham even
commented that "' [w]ithout publicity, all other checks are
insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of
small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions
might present themselves in the character of checks, would be
found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality,
as checks only in appearance."'4 6
B. Richmond Newspapers
In extending this access right to criminal trials, the Richmond
Newspapers plurality looked at history, which it said
"demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws
were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long
42. Id. at 47-48.
43. Id. at 50.
44. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)
(plurality).
45. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart coined the term "Fourth
Estate," referring to the media during an address to the Sesquicentennial
Convocation at Yale Law School. He said that the press clause of the First
Amendment is a "'structural provision' operating to create 'a fourth
institution outside the government to check the potential excesses of the
other three branches.'" PowE, supra note 2, at 260-61.
46. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 569 (plurality) (quoting
JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
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been presumptively open."47 The plurality's walk through history
took it back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where
early scholars once noted "the importance of openness to the
proper functioning of a trial."48 The plurality also reasoned that
conducting trials under the public's watch has a "therapeutic"
effect on the community.49 For example, media coverage of the
judicial system provides an "outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion."50
The State of Virginia, in Richmond Newspapers, argued
vehemently that the Framers had never intended a right of access
to judicial proceedings.5 1 Ironically, the state's argument against
expanding the scope of the First Amendment was made in the
same courthouse where, over 200 years before, patriot Patrick
Henry advocated for freedom of speech and press.5 2 The state's
argument centered on the simple assertion that the Framers did
not intend for the public to have a right to attend trials because
the Constitution does not mention such a right.5 3 The plurality
summarily dismissed the state's contention, explaining that the
Framers anticipated this argument.5 4 The plurality recalled that
the Framers had even grappled with adopting a Bill of Rights
altogether out of a fear that this same interpretation would be
made. 55 Nevertheless, it rejected the state's argument by listing
numerous examples of important rights the Court has recognized
that are not enumerated in the Constitution, including the right to
privacy, the right of association, the right to be presumed
innocent, and the right to travel. 56 Having resolved that
fundamental rights may be recognized even when they are not
expressly guaranteed, the plurality concluded that without a right
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 570.
50. Id. at 571.
51. Id. at 579.
52. David M. O'Brien, The Trials and Tribulations of Courtroom Secrecy
and Judicial Craftsmanship: Reflections on Gannett and Richmond
Newspapers, in CENSORSHIP, SECRECY, ACCESS, AND OBSCENITY 177, 195
(Theodore R. Kupferman ed., 1990); Brief of Appellants, Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (No. 79-243).
53. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 579 (plurality).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 579-80.
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of access, "important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press
could be eviscerated.' 57 The plurality found that the First
Amendment prevents the government from arbitrarily closing
courtroom doors in criminal trials,58 but it also acknowledged that
there certainly could be cases where an overriding interest would
warrant closure; however, it clarified that the overriding interest
may only be considered after a presumption of openness is
recognized.5 9
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers set the stage for the Supreme Court's later
interpretations of the extent of the plurality's newly recognized
First Amendment access right. Brennan's opinion centered on the
structural role the First Amendment plays in democracy.60
Brennan contended that the First Amendment was meant to
provide for uninhibited, informed debate. He wrote, "[t]he
structural model links the First Amendment to that process of
communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus
entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for
the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication."61
Without a right of access, informed debate could not flourish,
Brennan argued.62 Having concluded that access is necessary to
the enjoyment of First Amendment rights, Brennan noted that the
task of determining which proceedings or documents are
accessible "is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical
necessities as it is of abstract reasoning."63 To aid courts in
making such a determination, Brennan offered what he deemed
two helpful principles.64 These principles later became known as
the Court's two-prong test for determining if there is a qualified
First Amendment access right to a judicial proceeding or
document.
57. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
58. See DOUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL: SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS SINCE 1807 166 (1994).
59. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality).
60. Id. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 587 n.3 (quoting Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 588.
64. Id. at 589.
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C. Press-Enterprise I & Press-Enterprise II
Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered its plurality
decision, three right-of-access claims appeared on the Supreme
Court docket. 65 The most notable cases were Press-Enterprise I
and Press-Enterprise II, where the Court recognized that a
qualified First Amendment access right extends in criminal
trials,66 to the voir dire process, 67 and to preliminary hearings, 68
respectively. The Supreme Court's Press-Enterprise II decision
applied the two-part test, derived from Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, to determine when
there is a qualified First Amendment access right to a proceeding
in question.69 According to the Court, courts must engage in a two-
part test involving "two complementary considerations." 70 The
history prong questions whether the proceeding or process in
question has historically been open to the press and the general
public, while the logic prong considers whether public access plays
a significant positive role in the functioning of the process. 71 In
deciding that access was warranted, the Court held that both
prongs were satisfied, thereby vesting the media with a qualified
65. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982)
(holding that a Massachusetts statute excluding the general public and the
media from the courtroom in trials of specified sexual offenses during
testimony of minor victims of sex crimes was unconstitutional); Press-Enter.
Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 1), 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
66. Although the United States Supreme Court has only recognized a
qualified First Amendment right of access in criminal cases, because the
Court has never had a civil right of access case before it, lower courts have
been charged with deciding whether to apply the right in the civil context as
well. Most courts recognize that Press-Enterprise II applies to civil cases as
well. See Matthew D. Bunker, Closing the Courtroom: Judicial Access and
Constitutional Scrutiny After Richmond Newspapers, in AcCEss DENIED:
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 155, 167 (Charles N.
Davis & Sigman L. Splichal eds., 2000).
67. Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501.
68. Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. 1.
69. Id. at 8. The United States Supreme Court has only considered the
First Amendment right of access in the context of judicial proceedings but
almost all lower courts recognize that the right applies to judicial documents
as well. See Traciel V. Reid, An Affirmative First Amendment Access Right, in
CENSORSHIP, SECRECY, ACCESS AND OBSCENITY 403, 411-14 (Theodore R.
Kupferman ed., 1990).
70. Press-Enter. I, 478 U.S. at 8.
71. Id.
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First Amendment access right to preliminary hearings. 72
Importantly, while the Court held that both prongs were satisfied,
there is no indication in its decision that both prongs were
required.
The Press-Enterprise decisions were the last right of access
cases to appear on the Supreme Court's docket. Since then, lower
state and federal courts have been charged with interpreting the
scope of this newly recognized right.73 Several lower courts have
interpreted the Supreme Court's holding to include a qualified
right of access to "'suppression hearings, bail hearings, sentencing
hearings, change of venue hearings, plea hearings, contempt
hearings, pretrial ex parte recusal hearings, post conviction
proceedings, parole revocation proceedings, parole release
hearings, executions, bench conferences, chambers conferences,
juvenile proceedings, court martials, civil case proceedings,
preliminary injunction proceedings, and closure proceedings."' 74
Although a qualified right of access was recognized in those cases,
this is not to say that courts will continue to afford absolute access
in these types of proceedings, nor would continual access to these
proceedings necessarily be warranted. Undoubtedly, it could not
be contended that there is an absolute access right to the above
enumerated proceedings and documents, because such an absolute
right would likely implicate other constitutional violations. 75
Rather, these examples indicate willingness on the part of both
state and federal courts to recognize an initial presumption of
openness that may still be overcome, but only if access impedes a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights or if a compelling state
interest is asserted and the closure is narrowly tailored to meet
72. Id. at 13.
73. Bunker, supra note 66, at 162.
74. Id. (citing Thomas F. Liotti, The Second Circuit Review: 1996-97
Term: First & Sixth Amendments: Closing the Courtroom to the Public: Whose
Rights are Violated? 63 BROOK. L. REv. 501, 533 (1997)). See also THE
REPORTER'S KEY: RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 30-35 (A.B.A. 1994).
For a complete breakdown of court decisions categorized by the type,
proceeding, or document in question, see Dan Paul & Richard J. Ovelmen,
Access, published annually in COMMUNICATIONS LAW published by the
Practicing Law Institute.
75. The Sixth Amendment is often the source of conflict when
determining whether a First Amendment right of access to a particular
proceeding or document is warranted. See CAMPBELL, supra note 58.
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that interest.76
III. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since 1986, courts have grappled with interpreting the
Supreme Court's Press-Enterprise II test.77 The Supreme Court,
silent on the issue of whether both prongs needed to be satisfied,
instead said that its prior decisions have "emphasized two
complementary considerations."78 The plain meaning of the word
complementary is "supplying mutual needs or offsetting mutual
lacks."79 Beyond the Court's failure to mandate satisfaction of both
prongs, the Court's language suggests that either prong would
advance the same objective. That is, the Court sought to devise a
test that would ensure a presumption of openness to judicial
proceedings. By limiting the scope of that presumption to those
proceedings that had a long history of openness (an indication that
society was willing to accept media access to proceedings of this
76. See generally BUNKER, supra note 19. The test, as originally
illustrated in Richmond Newspapers, and later reaffirmed in Press-Enterprise
II involves a two-step consideration before access will be afforded. Step I
determines whether there is a presumption of openness to the proceeding,
while Step II determines if there is an overriding interest that warrants
closure, such as a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trail or other
compelling state interests that are necessary to preserve "higher values."
The test breaks down in the following way:
Step I:
a) Whether the place or process have historically been open to the press
and general public. (history prong)
b) Whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question. (logic prong)
Step II:
a) Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are impeded or a
compelling state interest is asserted.
b) Whether the closure is narrowly tailored to meet that specific interest.
See Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. at 8.
77. See Douglas Lee, Courtroom Access: Overview, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER, Jan. 3, 2005 (last updated),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org(Press/topic.aspx?topic=courtroomacce
ss (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) ("While the U.S. Supreme Court consistently has
reaffirmed the public's right of access to judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate judges implementing that right frequently have sacrificed the
public's right to know in order to ease the administration of justice.").
78. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 11), 478 U.S. 1, 9
(1986).
79. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 386 (3d
ed. 1996).
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sort) or those proceedings that would function better with the
public's scrutiny, the Court safeguarded against affording access
to all aspects of the judicial process. In particular, it appears the
Court was reluctant to afford a presumption of access to those
proceedings typically operating in secret, so as to protect the
involved parties' privacy.80 Nevertheless, by using the word
"complementary," the Court imparted that each prong is a
separate consideration. The logic prong compensates for what the
history prong lacks. For example, modern proceedings and
documents undoubtedly lack a long-standing history of openness;
however, access may still promote the functioning of these
processes. Therefore, the Court's "complementary" considerations
ensure that when a proceeding cannot meet one prong,
satisfaction of the other prong will achieve the same result.
Apart from the word "complementary," the Court considered
whether the proceeding met both prongs when applying the test
but it never explicitly held that a qualified right of access would
not be recognized if the proceeding could only meet one of the two
prongs.8' The decision's ambiguity has led courts to take varying
approaches when applying the test.8 2 The vast majority of courts
hold that the Court's test is conjunctive, whereby a qualified right
of access will only be recognized when a proceeding passes both
the history and the logic prongs.8 3 Other courts have broken
ground by recognizing the right when only one prong is satisfied.8 4
This latter approach is a recent trend and may reflect some courts'
final recognition that the history prong often cannot be satisfied
when modem forms of adjudication and innovative judicial devices
are utilized.
A. The Conjunctive Test
The Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fourth, and District of
80. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. at 9 (1986).
82. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
83. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003); United States v. Hani El-
Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160-62 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Balt. Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886
F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1989).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989).
See also Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 2003).
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Columbia Circuits have expressly held that both the history and
logic prongs must be met before the public is granted a qualified
right of access. In cases where courts cannot identify a history of
access to the type of proceeding or document at issue, these
Circuits often decline to engage in the logic inquiry and refuse to
recognize a qualified right of access.8 5 In some cases these Circuits
engage in the logic inquiry, making it clear, however, that
regardless of the result a right of access cannot be recognized on
one prong alone.8 6 Perhaps this strategy is useful for appeals
purposes but it adds further confusion to First Amendment access
right jurisprudence.
In United States v. Hani El-Sayegh 7 the District of Columbia
Circuit considered a claim of access to a plea agreement. The plea
agreement was submitted to the court before the plea was offered
to allow the court to rule on the government's initial motion to
seal the agreement.88 The government argued that there was
sensitive information in the agreement that required sealing.8 9
The defendant later repudiated the agreement entirely and
entered a not guilty plea.90 The government, unable to secure
corroborating evidence, moved to dismiss the indictment without
prejudice and the court granted the motion.91 The court noted
there has been a history of access to plea agreements that have
culminated in guilty pleas in court because such an agreement is,
in essence, a substitute for a trial. Nevertheless, the court could
not find a history of access to a plea agreement that has never
been admitted in court.92 The court noted that "it is impossible to
say that access to such a document has historically been
available . . . ."93 Because it held that the history prong could not
85. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
86. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198.
87. Hani El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 160-62.
88. Id. at 161. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2) requires plea
agreements to be disclosed in court (or, if good cause is shown, in camera) at
the time the plea is offered. Id. The government and the defendant sought to
file the agreement under seal because it contained sensitive and confidential
information. Sealing a document removes it from the media's and the public's
purview.
89. See id. at 159.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 161.
93. Id.
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be satisfied, the court declined to consider whether a qualified
right of access should be recognized under the logic prong.94 The
court did recognize the possibility that a lack of historical access
would not bar a court from finding that the history prong had been
met.95 For example, if a new procedure is substituted for an older
procedure, a court could look at the long history of access that
accompanied the older procedure. 96 However, when the proceeding
or document is "entirely novel," it may never pass the test.97
The Third Circuit took a similar approach in North Jersey
Media Group v. Ashcroft98 when it held that a qualified First
Amendment access right could not be recognized on the logic
prong alone. 99 The court held that a media outlet did not have a
First Amendment right to attend post-September 11th deportation
hearings.10 0 Although the court appropriately engaged in the logic
inquiry and found it was not satisfied, the decision clearly
established that even if the court had found that the logic prong
was satisfied it believed its hands were tied. The majority was
convinced that it could not hold that a qualified right of access
vested absent a finding that both prongs were met.10'
The Fourth Circuit, in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz 10 2 also held
that the Supreme Court's test was conjunctive. 0 3 In that case, the
Baltimore Sun sought access to sealed search warrant affidavits
that were issued by a federal magistrate and executed by law
enforcement officials. 10 4 Although the court recognized a Circuit
split with respect to a First Amendment access right to search
warrant affidavits, it held that because there had not been a





98. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
99. Id. at 213.
100. Id. at 204-05. The court's holding is in stark contrast to the Sixth
Circuit's decision that same year. The Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, recognized a qualified right of access to deportation hearings based
on satisfaction of both prongs. 303 F.3d 681, 705 (6th Cir. 2002).
101. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 216.
102. Balt. Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1989).
103. See id. at 64.
104. Id. at 62.
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be recognized. 05 The court expressed concerns about jeopardizing
an individual's fair trial,o6 but because Press-Enterprise II
allowed preclusion of access when it is essential to preserve
"higher values" and the closure is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest, the court's concerns should have been properly addressed
under the Press-Enterprise II inquiry.
B. The Disjunctive Test
Other courts continue to struggle applying the test. The First
Circuit parted from its sister Circuits in 2003 when it announced
in dicta that if it was called upon to decide how to apply the Press-
Enterprise I test, it would not hold that both prongs must be
satisfied. 10 7 In Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly,10s the court
examined a First Amendment access claim to financial affidavits
and a document summarizing a criminal defendant's debt that
had been submitted to the court under the Criminal Justice Act
(CJA) for government funding of a portion of his attorney's fees
and legal expenses.'0 9 The court engaged in the Press-Enterprise II
inquiry to decide whether a qualified First Amendment access
right could be recognized. 110 Although the court recognized it could
draw analogies to determine whether there was a history of access
to similar documents, in this case it could not find that there were
strong analogies to warrant recognition of a history of access. 11'
Unlike other courts that would end the inquiry there, the court
considered whether access to the document would play a positive
role in the actual functioning of the process, under the logic
prong. 12 The court decided that "[slome courts have treated these
considerations as a two-prong test, with a pair of elements that
must both be satisfied .... We are unpersuaded that this is the
correct reading of the 'complementary considerations' of Press-
105. Id. at 64.
106. Id.
107. Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 2003).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 175-76.
110. Id. at 180-82.
111. Id. at 184 ("The analogies must be solid ones, however, which serve
as reasonable proxies for the 'favorable judgment of experience' concerning
access to the actual documents in question.").
112. Id. at 186.
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Enterprise II."113 Ultimately the court concluded that public access
to a defendant's financial documents would in fact play a negative,
not a positive role, but it recognized that access could be afforded
on one prong alone." 4 Although Circuit Judge Lipez's dissent
suggested that the history prong should be eliminated, 1 5 the
majority maintained that it could not ignore tradition altogether
following Press-Enterprise 11.116 Rather, it noted "the absence of
analogous tradition might not doom a claim where the functional
argument for access to a type of judicial document is strong."1 7
Nevertheless, in this case, the court was unable to find that the
document passed either prong."18 While the immediate result in
Connolly was to deny the Boston Herald access to the documents,
the decision itself was a glimmer of hope for media access
advocates. Media outlets, in the First Circuit at least, can
anticipate that their rights to access innovative judicial
proceedings and documents will be protected, despite the
proceeding's or document's infancy.
C. Exceptions to the conjunctive test move toward a disjunctive
application
Connolly marked the first time a Circuit recognized a
willingness to continually treat the Press-Enterprise test as
disjunctive. In some other cases, Circuits that have traditionally
interpreted the Press-Enterprise II test as conjunctive have made
exceptions when the logic prong alone was strikingly strong." 9 In
United States v. Suarez, 20 the Second Circuit recognized access on
the logic prong alone.' 2 ' The Suarez court examined the same type
of access examined in Connolly but arrived at a different
113. Id. at 182.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 201 (Lipez, J., dissenting) ("In the end there is no sound reason
to exclude criminal proceedings of recent origin from the reach of the First
Amendment simply because they cannot match the lineage of proceedings
that have long been part of the criminal process.").
116. Id. at 184 n.5 ("We do not think we are free, under Press-Enterprise
II, to simply ignore tradition. Analogies will frequently prove useful
reasoning tools which lawyers are well trained to employ.").
117. Id.
118. Id. at 189.
119. United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 626 (2d Cir. 1989).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 631.
UNLOCKING COURTHOUSE DOORS
conclusion, holding the lack of tradition with respect to access to
CJA forms does not detract from the public's strong interest in
how its funds are being spent in the administration of criminal
justice.122 Interestingly, a district court decision rendered after
Suarez, but before Connolly, found a qualified right of access
attached to a CJA document, drawing on analogies to satisfy the
history prong and concluding that the second prong was strong. 123
Although the court did not delve deeply into the historical analysis
and merely set forth arguments both for and against finding
history based on analogy, the court determined access should be
presumed because "presence of the public improves the
performance of all participants, educates the public in the
workings of the judicial process, and subjects the judicial system
to a healthy public scrutiny"; on these presumptions, a qualified
right of access attached. 124
Like the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit has, on occasion,
parted from its traditional conjunctive test.125 In United States v.
Simone, the Third Circuit considered a right of access claim to
post-trial hearings concerning juror misconduct. 126 Although the
court found there had not been a long history of access to such
proceedings, it likened the case to another decision rendered in
the years between Richmond Newspapers and Press-Enterprise II,
where the Third Circuit "did not believe that historical analysis
was relevant to the determination of whether the First
Amendment [access right applied] .... "127 Instead, the court
"focused on 'the current role of the first amendment and the
societal interests,"' thereby relying primarily on the logic prong. 128
122. Id. ("The lack of 'tradition' with respect to the CJA forms does not
detract from the public's strong interest in how its funds are being spent in
the administration of criminal justice and what amounts of public funds are
paid to particular private attorneys or firms.").
123. United States v. Ellis, 154 F.R.D. 692, 696-97 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
Although the right of access attached, the court ultimately refused to allow
access after finding that the defendant's attorney client privilege and Fifth
Amendment rights would be jeopardized, which was sufficient to overcome
the First Amendment presumption of openness. Id.
124. Id. at 696.
125. United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 837.
127. Id. at 838.
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir.
1982)).
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Under the logic prong the court made several findings, which
included: 1) public access to post-trial hearings regarding juror
misconduct helps assure the public that the system is fair; 2)
access discourages juror misconduct and assures the public of the
integrity of those who participate in the system; and 3) access
discourages perjury in many cases because the public might be
able to contradict the perjured testimony if it learns about the
testimony from the media. 129 With these principles in mind, the
court held there was a qualified right of access to the post-trial
juror misconduct hearing, even though the history prong was
wholly lacking. 130
The inconsistencies of courts' application of the Press-
Enterprise II test are particularly troublesome because the
varying results leave the media with little guidance as to which
proceedings will be open in the future. More importantly, however,
the conjunctive test moves further away from the Framers'
intentions of a right of access to governmental processes as a
means of promoting a free press. The court's dicta in Connolly
proved to be a victory for media access, yet this has not changed
the analyses of the vast majority of courts, 131 which still interpret
the Supreme Court's test as conjunctive.
IV. MOVING TOWARD A DISJUNCTIVE TEST NECESSARY TO RESTORE
FIRST AMENDMENT'S PRESUMPTION OF OPENNESS
A. Disjunctive test provides true intent and restores presumption
The disjunctive test provides a workable means of restoring
the Framers' intention of a presumption of openness to an
otherwise problematic interpretation of the Supreme Court's test.
The Supreme Court's Press-Enterprise 11 two-pronged test,
properly construed as a disjunctive test, whereby satisfaction of
either prong would vest the media with a qualified First
Amendment access right, would properly reopen courthouse doors.
Although the door will undoubtedly be closed when the second
step of the Press-Enterprise 1I analysis is satisfied, a presumption
of openness will allow the media access so long as a defendant's
129. See id. at 839.
130. Id. at 840.
131. See discussion supra Part III (Part III introduction).
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Sixth Amendment rights or a compelling state interest are not
infringed. 132 Each prong of the court's first analysis is sufficient on
its own to carry out the Framers' intent of awarding a
presumption of openness to judicial proceedings and documents. 133
In the end, the same reasons the Supreme Court asserted for
allowing the press and the public to attend criminal trials support
media access to other judicial proceedings and documents. That is,
the media's attendance will "[enhance] the quality" and
"[safeguard] the integrity" of the judicial process, while
heightening public respect by the "appearance of fairness" and
allowing the public to participate through attendance as a check
on the judicial process.13 4
1. Finding access on history prong alone
When the Constitution was drafted and Amendments were
made, the Framers were conscious of the importance of reflecting
upon history to find reasoned judgments. 135 Justice Frankfurter
even observed that "' [t]he Founders of this Nation were not
imbued with the modem cynicism that the only thing that history
teaches is that it teaches nothing. They acted on the conviction
that the experience of man sheds a good deal of light on his
nature."' 36 Richmond Newspapers was decided under the history
prong for precisely this same reason; that is, "a tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience." 37 The
Richmond Newspapers plurality based its decision on the
important role that open criminal trials serve in the proper
administration of justice, looking to the English system for
guidance. According to one legal scholar, "[i]t is one of the most
conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are
held in open court.... [T]he English system ensures that the
enormous force of public opinion is brought to bear on the
132. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 11), 478 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1986).
133. See infra Parts IV.A.1, IV.A.2.
134. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
135. See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
HISTORY 172 (1969).
136. Id. (quoting Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
137. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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proceedings in court, and that the judge and jury are compelled to
hear both sides of the case."138 A look at history, whether it is the
United States or English system, for guidance is a continual trend
in constitutional interpretation. 139 Indeed, this is not to say that a
proceeding must have a thousand years of experience 140 before it
will be recognized under the history prong, but when access has
been afforded for some considerable length of time the "favorable
judgment of experience" is shown. Reliance on history eliminates
arbitrary decision-making and provides a consistent pattern of
those proceedings that are open, allowing the media to anticipate
where access will be allowed. This means that affording access
based on the history prong eliminates case-by-case scrutiny, at
least with respect to the court's first analysis. In both Press-
Enterprise 11 and Rivera-Pueg v. Garcia-Rosario,'4' the courts
noted that the experience test must be applied in light of the
experience of openness of that type of proceeding or document
throughout the United States, not just experience in one
jurisdiction. 42 The Court's insistence on uniformity guarantees
that a document or proceeding that has always been afforded
access in other jurisdictions, will be equally afforded access in all
jurisdictions, allowing media outlets to know in advance and
predict what proceedings will typically be open, so that they can
better serve the public in their judicial coverage. 43
Furthermore, affording access based on the history prong
alone sounds in judicial convenience. If a proceeding or a
document has always been afforded access, it is unnecessary for a
138. EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (Ohio Univ. Press
1967) (1928). Jenks also noted that, in some cases, this interest can be
overridden when it is essential for a proceeding to take place in secret. Id. at
74.
139. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, ILLUSION
AND REALITY, 54-55 (2001) ("History can and should be used to inform the
balancing process; it should not, however, replace it.").
140. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d
Cir. 2002) ("[A] 1000-year history is unnecessary.").
141. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1
(1986); Rivera-Pueg v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311 (1992).
142. See Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. at 10-11; Rivera-Pueg, 983 F.2d at 323.
143. Although it is argued infra that the history prong, in the context of
the conjunctive test, arrives at inconsistent results, this is because courts are
forced to make the proceeding or document fit into the history prong. Under
the disjunctive test, however, courts are not forced to stretch analogies to
make findings under the history prong.
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court to undergo an extensive analysis every time a media outlet
seeks access to a proceeding, except when considering whether
countervailing factors warrant closure. This is particularly
important in an era where courts are providing electronic access to
court documents. So long as the type of document has always been
available for the public and the media to access and inspect, court
employees should rest assured that this type of access will be
continually afforded. Therefore, automatic electronic access to
these documents will be presumed unless a party seeks closure. If
a party does seek closure, the documents can be shielded from
public and media scrutiny so long as the party proves that closure
is warranted under heightened or strict scrutiny, depending on
which level of scrutiny the court applies. Court initiatives to make
some information readily accessible electronically will be curtailed
if forced to undergo this analysis each time, defeating both the
aims of the First Amendment and the aims of courts hoping to
make their proceedings more accessible. Rather, if access has
always been afforded to the document in question, access should
vest immediately and should only be divested in cases where a
party satisfies the burden of proving that closure is warranted
because a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights would be
jeopardized or some other "higher values" need to be preserved.
Lastly, although it may be contended that courts should not
continue to uphold access to proceedings merely because access to
that type of proceeding has always been afforded, because the
history prong already embodies the logic prong analysis, many of
the safeguards supporting the conjunctive test are already
ingrained in the history prong of the disjunctive test. 144
The history prong has not been without criticism.
Commentators agree that the test presents many problems when
deciding whether access should be afforded. 145 These criticisms are
aimed predominately at the history prong's effect when analyzed
as part of the conjunctive test. Some commentators and jurists
contend that the history prong serves no purpose and ought to be
144. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2004)
("Experience casts an affirming eye on the openness of docket sheets and
their historical counterparts.").
145. See Bunker, supra note 66, at 172; Kimba M. Wood, The 1995 Justice
Lester W. Roth Lecture: Reexamining the Access Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1105, 1105-20 (1996).
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eliminated from the court's analysis because it hinders access to
many documents. 146 Proposals to eliminate the history prong are
aimed at affording greater access to judicial processes but
ultimately leave courts with fewer confines and confer greater
discretion to courts in rendering access decisions. For example,
eliminating the history prong altogether would mean that courts
could deny access to proceedings that have always been afforded
access. Additionally, eliminating the history prong entirely would
move away from the Founders' strong belief in relying upon the
teachings of history and experience of man.147 Without the history
prong, courts would be able to resolve cases on the logic prong
alone. The result is that a court, which is increasingly reluctant to
afford access to one particular criminal proceeding, may deny
access by posturing that public access does not contribute to the
system's positive functioning. The ultimate effect is that an
individual's fair criminal trial could be jeopardized because part of
the rationale in the presumptive openness of judicial proceedings
is to allow the media to scrutinize judicial proceedings in an effort
to ensure that the integrity of the judicial system is maintained. 48
Similarly, some commentators have proposed using a sliding
scale-type balancing test, whereby a stronger prong may make up
for a weaker prong.149 This also defeats the aims of the First
Amendment in affording a right of access to judicial proceedings.
By using a sliding scale, courts are likely to place greater, if not
too much, reliance on the logic prong each time a proceeding or
document fails the history test or has a weak or limited history of
146. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 200 (1st Cir. 2003)
(Lipez, J., dissenting); Wood, supra note 145.
147. See supra note 135.
148. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980)
(plurality) ("The public trial, one of the essential qualities of a court of justice
in England, was recognized early in the colonies. There were risks, of course,
inherent in such a "town meeting" trial .... The modern trial with jurors
open to interrogation for possible bias is a far cry from the "town meeting
trial" of ancient English practice. Yet even our modern procedural protections
have their origin in the ancient common law principle, which provided, not
for closed proceedings, but rather for rules of conduct for those who attend
trials.... Openness in criminal trials, including the selection of jurors,
"enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."). See also
FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 3 (1998).
149. See Bunker, supra note 66, at 172.
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openness. In these cases, the result is that courts, mindful of a
result they wish to achieve, whether it is opening or closing the
proceeding to media access, will be inclined to overemphasize one
prong to compensate for a weaker prong.
2. Finding access on the logic prong alone
The logic prong dictates that public and media access should
be afforded when "access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question."150 The list of
reasons why access may play a significant positive role in the
functioning of the process is long, as the Richmond Newspapers
plurality illustrated. Most importantly, open public trials have a
therapeutic value, while also enhancing the fairness of the trial
and the public's confidence in the system. 1 1 Beyond that, "public
inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education and hopefully
promotes confidence in the fair administration of justice." 52
Ultimately, the plurality hoped that access would contribute "to
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of
the functioning of the entire criminal justice system."153 Allowing
media access would foster this goal because the media functions as
a surrogate for the public.154
Additionally, the Third Circuit has identified six societal
interests a court may consider when determining whether public
access to a document or proceeding enhances its function, thus
satisfying the logic prong:
Promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs
by providing the public with the more complete
understanding of the judicial system; promotion of the
public perception of fairness which can be achieved only
by permitting full public view of the proceedings;
providing a significant community therapeutic value as
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion;
serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the
150. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 11), 478 U.S. 1, 8
(1986).
151. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 570 (plurality).
152. Id. at 573.
153. Id. (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
154. Id. at 572.
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judicial processes to public scrutiny; enhancement of the
performance of all involved; and discouragement of
peijury.155
Although the logic prong traditionally focuses on whether
disclosure is necessary to aid the functioning of the system, some
suggest that the issue should not be seen in terms of whether
disclosure would aid the functioning of the system, but rather
whether disclosure would defeat the purpose of the judicial
process at issue.156 While this approach would break new ground
for media access rights, 157 it does not seem this is a feasible
approach for courts in light of over twenty years of relatively
consistent interpretation of the Richmond Newspapers logic test.
The logic prong has not been subjected to the great criticism
that its historical counterpart has endured. Nevertheless, some
commentators maintain that making decisions based on the logic
prong alone would result in opening every judicial document or
proceeding because public access almost always plays some
significant positive role in the functioning of the process in
question. 158 Criticism aimed at the logic prong strikes at the very
heart of the Supreme Court's objective of creating a presumption
of openness under the First Amendment. This argument fails to
consider that just because a qualified First Amendment access
right exists does not mean that access will be afforded. Access will
be continually denied when closure is essential to preserve "higher
values" and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Access
must continue to be presumed under the logic prong to carry out
the First Amendment's intent of allowing the public and the
media to cast a watchful eye on judicial proceedings. 159
155. United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1997).
156. See Steinfield, supra note 24, at 7, 23 (referring to Judge Lipez's
dissent in Connolly and proposing that this approach should be deemed the
"detriment" view of the logic prong).
157. Id.
158. See Wood, supra note 145, at 1105-20.
159. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
In a society in which each individual has but limited time and
resources with which to observe at first hand the operation of his
government, he relies necessarily upon the press (and media) to
bring him to convenient form the fact of these operations. Great
responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to report
fully and accurately the proceedings of the government, and official
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B. Failings of current test
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny were intended to
create a presumption of openness and "designed to vindicate the
central purpose of the First Amendment by making the operations
of government institutions subject to effective public scrutiny."160
The plurality envisioned open trials as a means of promoting
fairness and integrity in the decision-making process. Despite the
Court's vision of affording a presumption of access so that the
judicial system could be held accountable to the people, courts'
interpretations have continually moved away from a presumption
of openness and have instead embraced a presumption of closure,
at least when a proceeding fails the history prong. 161 Inevitably,
these courts continually deny a qualified right of access to modern
adjudicative innovations, which, by their very nature, are
unsupported by a history of access.1 62 Therefore, only twenty years
records and documents open to the public are the basic data of
governmental operations. Without the information provided by the
press (and media) most of us and many of our representatives would
be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally. With respect to judicial
proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to
guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial
effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.
Id.
160. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D. Mass
1993).
161. See United States v. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d 194 (D.R.I. 2001); United
States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. 129, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying
access without ever considering the logic prong because a proceeding failed
the court's history analysis); accord Calder v. Comm'r, 890 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1989); but see N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 211 (3d
Cir. 2002) (examining the logic prong after determining there was no history
of access but noting that even if it found the proceeding passed the second
prong, the court would still deny access because "the tradition of open
deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support a First
Amendment right of access."). See also Balt. Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60,
64-65 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ellis, 154 F.R.D. 692, 696-97 (M.D.
Fla. 1993).
162. See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213, 216 (finding that there
was no history of access to deportation hearings and precluding access on the
basis that it does not embrace recognition of a right of access absent a strong
showing of openness under the experience prong). Those courts, which hold
that access may be afforded on one prong, alone, however, find that the
relative newness of a judicial proceeding or document will not preclude the
court from awarding access. See United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 631
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after a plurality of the Supreme Court announced its hopeful goals
in Richmond Newspapers, courts have lost sight of the
presumption of openness that the First Amendment affords to
judicial proceedings. 163
Courts, intent on awarding access only when there is both a
history of access to the proceeding and when logic dictates that
access should be afforded, overlook a core premise of the
Constitution. As Chief Justice John Marshall twice explained, "a
constitution is framed for ages to come." 164 Moreover, the
Constitution is "intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." 165  Because Marshall continually emphasized the
Constitution's flexibility, allowing it to be adapted to meet
society's needs, one would be hard-pressed to claim that the
Framers intended that courts only afford a right of access to those
proceedings and documents that were open to the public when the
Constitution was drafted. 166 Nevertheless, every time a court
declines to recognize a qualified right of access to a judicial
proceeding or document because a history of access is lacking, it
undermines the founding principles of the Constitution. The only
plausible application of Marshall's explanation of the
Constitution's role with respect to First Amendment right-of-
access jurisprudence is that the First Amendment guarantees a
(2d Cir. 1989) ("It is true that there is no long 'tradition of accessibility' to
CJA forms. However, that is because the CJA itself is, in terms of 'tradition,'
a fairly recent development, having been enacted in 1964 .... The lack of
'tradition' with respect to CJA forms does not detract from the public's strong
interest in how its funds are being spent in the administration of criminal
justice and what amounts of public funds are paid to particular private
attorneys or firms.").
163. See discussion supra Part II.
164. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821).
165. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).
166. The Richmond Newspapers, Inc. plurality noted that the "First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been
open to the public at the time the Amendment was adopted." 448 U.S. 555,
576 (1980) (plurality). Although courts have since noted that the history
prong may be satisfied even if the proceeding has not enjoyed 1,000 years of
access, these courts rely on analogies which may be drawn to other similar
proceedings when a new proceeding or document has replaced an old practice.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Courts retain considerable
discretion when drawing such analogies, inevitably arriving at different
results. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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qualified right of access to those judicial proceedings and
documents that were presumptively open in the late eighteenth
century; however, this should not preclude courts from recognizing
a right of access absent a history of openness.
1. The blurred line between the court's inquiries lowers defendants'
burden of proof
A continual trend emerging when courts apply the conjunctive
test is that the Court's two inquiries are losing their intended
separation, thus shifting the burden of proof. In every First
Amendment right-of-access case rendered by the Supreme Court,
the Court has stressed that there are two separate inquiries that
must be considered. 167 The first inquiry considers only whether
there is a presumption of access to the proceeding based on history
and logic. 168 If the answer is in the negative, the court should look
no further and deny access. If, however, the court finds there is a
presumption of access, it must then consider whether a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are impeded or a compelling
state interest is implicated. 169 If the court finds it is, it must then
consider whether closure is narrowly tailored to meet that specific
interest.170 By this method the defendant carries the burden of
proving that an otherwise open proceeding must be closed. 17'
The line dividing these two seemingly separate inquires has
been blurred in recent years. Courts' discretion under the history
prong is primarily to blame. Courts are empowered with great
discretion to make relevant analogies under the historical analysis
to help determine if the proceeding or document is of the type that
has traditionally been afforded access. 72 For example, courts have
looked to the traditional openness of criminal trials as historical
167. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 11), 478 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. 1), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580-81 (plurality).
168. Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. at 8-9.
169. Id. at 9.
170. Id.
171. See Oberlander, supra note 13, at 2242-44.
172. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 2003)
(citing Rivera-Pueg v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992)
("Tradition is not meant, we think, to be construed so narrowly; we look also
to analogous proceedings and documents of the same "type or kind.")).
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support for allowing access to a document submitted in connection
with a criminal trial, thereby allowing such documents to satisfy
the history prong. 173 Because access has always been afforded to
the criminal trial, courts sometimes reason that access to a
document submitted in connection with a criminal proceeding or a
related criminal hearing should be afforded as well. 174 Other
courts expressly reject this notion, requiring closer analogies
before a proceeding or document passes the history prong. 175 At
least one commentator has examined the analogies courts use to
arrive at particular results. 176 For example, a court mindful that
at the end of the day access should not be afforded because a
defendant's rights may be jeopardized, may intentionally or
unintentionally weave this policy decision into its initial
consideration under the history test. Courts that mesh the history
prong together with the determination that a particular type of
access will prejudice a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights or
infringe upon some other "higher value," overlook that closure is
only warranted when a defendant proves that the open proceeding
or document rises to the level of prejudice necessary under a strict
scrutiny or heightened scrutiny analysis.
At first glance, it appears it would make no difference
whether the court decided under the history and logic prong that
no qualified First Amendment access right vested in the
proceeding or whether it decided that a qualified right of access
existed, but was then trumped by a defendant's competing
interests, warranting closure. Clearly, access would be denied in
either case. However, the ongoing debate over the appropriate
level of scrutiny that must be applied in the court's secondary
analysis could inevitably impact the result.177 Legal scholars have
attempted to sift through the Court's language in Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny to determine what level of scrutiny
the Supreme Court intended to afford, but these efforts have been
173. See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2002); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502-03 (1st Cir. 1989).
174. See Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d at 11; Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 502-
03.
175. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d
Cir. 2002).
176. See Wood, supra note 145, at 1115.
177. See BUNKER, supra note 19, at 94-115. See also O'Brien, supra note
52, at 206.
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unavailing. 178 For example, although the plurality in Richmond
Newspapers seemed to suggest that the secondary analysis merely
required heightened scrutiny, the majority in Globe Newspaper
Co. articulated a strict scrutiny test whereby closure is only
warranted when there is a compelling government interest
asserted and the closure is narrowly tailored to meet that
interest. 179 Two years later, the Court in Press-Enterprise I used
the words "'overriding'" and "'higher,"' terms that are traditionally
associated with a heightened scrutiny test. 8 0 Nevertheless, the
Court also quoted the Globe Newspaper Co. strict scrutiny test,
leaving courts and scholars perplexed over the level of scrutiny
warranted. 81 Finally, after another two years had passed, the
Press-Enterprise II decision applied heightened scrutiny.182
Unfortunately, the Court never addressed the confusion among its
previous decisions regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny,
leaving lower courts to wonder if the Court intended heightened
scrutiny to displace the previously applied strict scrutiny test.18 3
Lower courts have also applied differing levels of scrutiny when
determining whether closure is warranted. 8 4 That the Supreme
Court has yet to settle the appropriate level of scrutiny to be
applied in the secondary analysis is particularly troublesome.
Regardless of which level of scrutiny is applied, in every case
the burden is on the defendant to prove that closure is warranted.
Although defendants carry the burden of proving that closure is
warranted due to either a compelling or substantial interest that
overrides the presumption of openness (and also, in some cases,
proving that the closure is narrowly tailored to meet these
asserted interests), this heavy burden is often overlooked when
courts instead lump this analysis with the history prong. 8 5
178. BUNKER, supra note 19, at 94-115.
179. Id. at 96.
180. Id. at 98.
181. Id. (noting that because the two standards were articulated together
in the opinion suggests that the standard is equivalent to strict scrutiny).
182. Id. at 100.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 94 ("There seems to be little consistency among courts either in
the choice of test or the apparent commitment to the value of openness in
court proceedings.").
185. Courts have also injected this secondary consideration into the logic
prong, causing the same problem. In N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the
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Indeed, this is a skillful tactic employed by those courts wishing to
close access. By utilizing such an approach, courts essentially
eliminate a defendant's burden of proving that closure is
warranted.
2. Fitting a round peg into a square hole
A second impact of the conjunctive test is that its strict
confines force courts to stretch analogies to arrive at particular
results. Courts struggle to fit the round peg into the square hole
when proceedings would otherwise fail the history prong,
precluding access to the proceeding or document at issue. Courts,
mindful that at the end of the day access should be awarded, may
be inclined to engage in legal casuistry only because a strict
reading of the conjunctive test would deny access when the history
prong cannot be met. Courts that abandon a strict reading of the
historical analysis draw inaccurate and overreaching analogies
instead,186 which should never be encouraged.18 7 This happens in
cases where, although the court is aware that the "correct" result
is to afford media access, there has been no history of access to the
type of proceeding or document. Because under the conjunctive
test both prongs must be satisfied, courts must attempt to evade
the trappings of the history prong by likening the proceeding to
something wholly different than the proceeding at hand. 88 While
court parted from the traditional logic inquiry by adding to the analysis the
question of whether there were policies that favored closure. The court noted,
"Although existing case law on the logic prong has discussed only the policies
favoring openness, we are satisfied that the logic prong must consider the flip
side of the coin." 308 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2002).
186. In briefs to courts attorneys often stretch analogies to prove there has
been a history of access to a proceeding or document in dispute. For example,
in Boston Herald v. Connolly, counsel for the media company argued that
because CJA documents were part of the criminal case, they should be
afforded access because the criminal trial has always been afforded access.
321 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 2003).
187. See generally ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY (1988).
188. See Boston Herald, 321 F.3d at 200-01 (Lipez, J., dissenting) ("This
lack of tradition for criminal proceedings of recent origin places intervenors
like the Boston Herald in the awkward position of analogizing the documents
or proceedings at issue to materials or proceedings with traditions of
accessibility. Such analogies can be useful but not decisive. They are
inevitably assailable on grounds that the comparison is imperfect, or that
application of the tradition would prove too much.").
UNLOCKING COURTHOUSE DOORS
analytical reasoning is perhaps one of the most useful tools
employed by lawyers and judges,18 9 there comes a point where
analogies are stretched too far. By allowing courts to stretch these
analogies too far, inaccurate analogies result as courts force their
own moral values into the history prong. The likely result of
courts allowing such attenuated analogies is that courts will
arrive at inconsistent results regarding the same type of
proceedings.
Quintessential examples of the difficulties courts have had
applying the history prong emerged in 2002.190 In that year, two
Circuits, examining precisely the same type of proceeding, arrived
at different conclusions under their historical analyses. 191 Both the
Sixth and Third Circuits were called upon to decide whether the
First Amendment affords a qualified right of access to deportation
proceedings. 192 The Sixth Circuit concluded that deportation
hearings have historically been open to the public, thus surviving
the first prong, while only two months later the Third Circuit
rejected this approach, concluding that deportation hearings lack
the "tradition of openness sufficient to satisfy Richmond
Newspapers ."193
The result in each case suggests that the courts were able to
inject their own policy judgments into their considerations under
the historical analysis. The Third Circuit, perhaps reluctant to
afford access to deportation hearings, made this determination
under its history analysis, averting the need to prove that closure
was warranted under the court's secondary analysis. Meanwhile,
the Sixth Circuit engaged in the inquiry required by the Supreme
Court in Press-Enterprise II and found that because access has
traditionally been afforded to deportation hearings, and because
there are logical reasons supporting access, there should be a
189. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1992).
190. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002); N.
Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
191. Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701 with N. Jersey Media
Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
192. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d
at 199.
193. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212. Compare Detroit Free
Press, 303 F.3d at 701 with N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212.
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presumption of access to the proceedings.19 4 The Sixth Circuit
properly noted that this is not an absolute right of access and that
proceedings may be closed when a party proves there is a
compelling interest and that the closure is narrowly tailored to
achieve those asserted interests. 195 Nevertheless, the court refused
to close the proceedings because the blanket closure at issue was
not narrowly tailored to meet the government's compelling
interest.196 The decision, which proved to be a victory for media
rights, concluded that "[olpen proceedings, with a vigorous and
scrutinizing press, serve to ensure the durability of our
democracy."197
While the Sixth Circuit properly applied the Press-Enterprise
If test, the Third Circuit's approach effectively circumvented the
Supreme Court's analysis by finding that a presumption of access
never vested. With this circumvention, the Third Circuit
eliminated the need for a party to prove that closure was
necessary because opening the proceedings impinges upon a
compelling government interest and closure is narrowly tailored to
meet that interest.
The result in these cases further illustrates the difficulties of
the conjunctive test. By requiring that courts find that both
prongs are satisfied, courts will invariably arrive at different
conclusions under the historical analysis. This result runs
contrary to the very aims of the history prong, which seeks to
afford consistent access by allowing courts to base their historical
analysis on whether access has traditionally been afforded
throughout the United States, not just one jurisdiction. 9 8 A better
solution would be to allow courts to award access based on
satisfaction of either prong, thereby making it less likely that
courts would attempt to circumvent the secondary analysis.
3. Planning news coverage
Lastly, allowing courts to draw stretched analogies leaves the
media without a tool that would otherwise allow it to predict when
access will be afforded. It is important that reporters and media
194. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705.
195. Id. at 705-06.
196. Id. at 707-10.
197. Id. at 711.
198. See Rivera-Pueg v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992).
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outlets are able to track what type of proceedings and documents
are traditionally available so that information may be made
accessible to the general public. 199 Indeed, the media's right of
access would be of little value unless it could anticipate the types
of proceedings and documents that would be accessible.
Ultimately, proper application of the conjunctive test forces a
court to abruptly end its inquiry after determining that there has
not been a history of access to the type of proceeding in question,
without regard to whether the type of proceeding is an
adjudicative or administrative innovation. The end result is that
courts move further away from the First Amendment's intent to
provide public access to promote discussion of governmental
affairs, and its mission of ensuring the integrity of the judicial
system. Because modern proceedings and new forms of
adjudication have not endured the long history of public scrutiny
that the traditional criminal trial has, the argument is even more
compelling that the public needs to extend a more cautious eye to
ensure that these proceedings operate fairly and efficiently.
V. PRESUMPTION OF OPENNESS AS A MEANS OF RESTORING PUBLIC
FAITH IN THE JUDICIARY
Although the United States' Founders recognized that public
trials were the most effective means of ensuring that justice is
served,200 since the late eighteenth century the judiciary has
implemented numerous forms of adjudication and adjudicative
processes. The trial is no longer the only place where public
scrutiny is warranted. By implementing the disjunctive test and
thereby restoring a presumption of openness under the logic prong
to proceedings that would otherwise fail under the court's history
analysis, courts would allow the public eye to scrutinize modern
proceedings and decide for themselves whether justice is upheld.
It cannot be denied that "[olpenness and public access is the
ultimate guardian of fairness in our justice system."201
The Supreme Court itself has continually acknowledged the
role the press plays in ensuring that the integrity of the judicial
199. See THE REPORTER'S KEY, supra note 74, at 22-42, 59-65.
200. Frances Kahn Zemans, Public Access: The Ultimate Guardian of
Fairness in our Justice System, 79 JUDICATURE 173, 173 (1996).
201. Id.
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system is upheld. "A responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration .... The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial process to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism."202 Following this admonition, the Supreme Court's
decision in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny undoubtedly
recognized for the first time a qualified First Amendment access to
many proceedings and documents, recognizing far greater rights
for the media. 203 Nevertheless, because the adjudicative process is
constantly changing, the impact of Richmond Newspapers has
been curtailed at the expense of public trust and faith in the
judiciary.
A study conducted by the National Center for State Courts
and sponsored by the Hearst Corporation surveyed 1,826
Americans about their opinion of the judiciary.20 4 Analysts learned
that only twenty-three percent of Americans have a great deal of
trust and confidence in courts in their community, while thirty-
two percent have a great deal of trust and confidence in the
United States Supreme Court.205 Similarly, Americans expressed
dissatisfaction with the way courts handle cases.20 6 One possible
cause of American's lack of confidence in the judiciary is the
"[p]articular suspicion [that] arises when public institutions have
provided open access and later denied it to the public."20 7 Taking
away the presumption of openness to court documents and
proceedings will do nothing more than fuel American distrust in
202. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
203. Compare Joel M. Gora, THE RIGHTS OF REPORTERS, THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE TO A REPORTER'S RIGHTS (1977) with THE REPORTER'S KEY, supra note
74.
204. National Center for State Courts, National Conference on Public
Trust and Confidence in the Justice System, National Action Plan: A Guide
for State and National Organizations,
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
Res AmtPTCNatlActionPlanPub.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
205. National Center for State Courts, How the Public Views the State
Courts: A 1999 National Survey, 1999,
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAxtPTCPublicViewCrtsPu
b.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). See also JOSEPH R. WEISBERGER, THE
CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2
(n.d.).
206. How the Public Views the State Courts, supra note 205.
207. Zemans, supra note 200, at 175.
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the judiciary. Indeed, "[plublic trust and confidence in the way
[courts] do business is based, in part, on an open judiciary, which
means the judicial system must have some degree of transparency
to the extent permitted by law."208
Courts continually concern themselves with providing easier
access to court records, 209 often overlooking that the real problem
is the extent of access, not the ease of access. Courts must realize
that "[plublic trust and confidence in the courts are based on an
open judiciary and accurate public perception of it - for which the
bench, the bar, and the media are collectively responsible." 210
A return to the principles that guided the Richmond
Newspapers plurality is necessary to ensure that the public and
the media continue to scrutinize the judiciary. It is only then that
public confidence in the judiciary will rise because, of course, "the
means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from
public acceptance of both the process and its results."211
VI. CONCLUSION
Interpreting the Supreme Court's test as disjunctive is the
key for which the media has long awaited. The First Circuit's
recognition that the Supreme Court test, properly applied, is a
disjunctive test is a valiant stride toward restoring the
presumption of openness couched within the First Amendment's
grant, but courts must go one step further before achieving the
true test contemplated by the Richmond Newspapers plurality.
Moreover, courts must extract policy decisions favoring closure
from its history and logic inquiry and only contemplate these
considerations after determining whether a qualified right of
access vests. Although court watchers have continually
anticipated that it would not be long before the Supreme Court
took up the issue,212 with the denial of certiorari in N. Jersey
208. Ronald T. Y. Moon, Together, Courts and Media Can Improve Public
Knowledge of the Justice System, 87 JUDICATURE 205, 205 (2004).
209. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 465 (A.B.A.
2001).
210. Ronald T. Y. Moon, supra note 208, at 205.
211. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)
(plurality).
212. See Steinfield, supra note 24, at 15.
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Media Group v. Ashcroft,213 it seems the wait may be longer than
media outlets hoped. Nevertheless, it is important that courts
recognize it is not necessary to wait until the Supreme Court
resolves the issue. The Supreme Court's ambiguous holding, with
regard to whether the test is conjunctive or disjunctive, leaves
lower courts in a position to interpret and apply the test. Applying
the Court's holding as a disjunctive test will restore the First
Amendment's presumption of openness by reopening the
courthouse door and granting the media a qualified right of access
to carefully scrutinize court proceedings and documents. Although
the door will be bolted, keeping the media out, when a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights are in jeopardy or when closure is
necessary to preserve "higher values," the media will at minimum
have the chance to observe innovative adjudicative proceedings
and documents. Media observation of both traditional and modern
adjudicative processes continues to be essential in restoring public
faith in the judiciary.
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